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Note: Continuing Violations of Title VII:
A Suggested Approach
I. INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,' prohibits discrimina-
tion in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin. 2 The Act places a large part of the burden of enforce-
ment squarely on the victims of discrimination.3 With the exception
of "pattern or practice" cases,4 only an aggrieved person, acting as a
"private attorney general,"5 can bring suit directly against a discrimi-
nating employer. 6 A private party, however, has only 180 days7 from
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
2. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
Id. § 2000e-2(a).
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (e) (1970 & Supp. V 1975); Rosenfeld v. Southern
Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 1971) (objectives obtained by enforcement
initiated by aggrieved individuals); 110 CoNG. REc. 14186-90 (1964); Vaas, Title VI:
Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REv. 431, 452 (1966).
4. The Attorney General may bring a civil action whenever he has "reasonable
cause to believe that any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice
of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights secured by this subchap-
ter. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1970). The EEOC was given authority to investigate
and act on a pattern or practice charge by the 1972 amendments, which also provided
that such a charge could be filed by a member of the Commission. Equal Opportunity
Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 707(e), 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-6(e)(Supp. V 1975)). See note 10 infra.
5. See Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 33 (5th Cir. 1968). In Jenkins,
the court also referred to the individual as taking on the "mantel of the sovereign."
Id. at 32.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). A union, acting in its
representative capacity, can be an "aggrieved person" and file charges with the EEOC.
Chemical Workers Local 795 v. Planters Mfg. Co., 259 F. Supp. 365 (N.D. Miss. 1966).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(Supp. V 1975). If an applicable state or local agency
has its own enforcement precedures, the time for filing is the earlier of 300 days from
the date of the alleged illegal practice or 30 days after notice is received by the com-
plainant that the state or local agency has terminated its proceedings. Id. Both this
300/30-day period and the standard 180-day period were established by the 1972
amendments. As originally passed in 1964, Title VII allowed only 90 days for filing in
cases where no local or state agency was involved, and 180 days when state agency
involvement was present. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(d), 78
Stat. 260 (1964). A thorough examination of the legislative history gives no indication
as to why the 90-day limit was originally chosen. Most of the legislative history sur-
rounding the passage of Title VII comes from debates on the floor of the Senate and
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the date of an alleged unlawful employment practice to exercise this
power of enforcement by filing a charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC).8 As laypersons, employees often
are not fully aware of their rights under Title VII or the limitations
thereon, and a 180-day time limit for filing complaints may be pro-
hibitively short.' Thus, there seems to be a fundamental tension in
Title VII between its system of private enforcement and its short
limitations period.
The courts have attempted to resolve this tension by developing
the "continuing violation" doctrine. This doctrine circumvents the
time limitations for filing, thereby bringing an untimely charge
within the jurisdiction of the EEOC and the courts, and aiding the
"private attorney general" in his effort to effectuate the policies of
Title VII.
In general, the courts have found a continuing violation when the
discriminatory acts of an employer over a period of time form a suffi-
ciently integrated pattern to constitute, in effect, a single discrimina-
tory act.'0 If some part of this pattern occurred within the 180 days
therefore fails to clearly express congressional intent. See generally Vaas, supra note
3, at 457.
For the sake of convenience, this Note will refer only to the 180-day figure in
discussions of Title VII's limitations period. For the same reason, this Note also will
refer to the party filing a complaint with the EEOC as "employee" and the party
committing the alleged discriminatory act as "employer," although this is not always
the case. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(b)-(d) (1970); note 6 supra.
8. The EEOC is the federal agency created by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
charged with the responsibility of investigating alleged violations of Title VII. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) to 4(i) (1970).
9. Courts that refuse to dismiss the untimely complaint of an employee are often
influenced by the fact that the employee is a layperson. See, e.g., EEOC v. Western
Publishing Co., 502 F.2d 599, 602-03 (8th Cir. 1974). Factors other than a layperson's
lack of knowledge also may contribute to delay in filing charges of discrimination. For
example, an employee may fear reprisal by the employer, see EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY: COMPLIANCE AND AFFIRMATIvE AcTIoN 16 (T. Powers ed. 1969), or may
refer the matter to a union which may decide to take no action until after the 180 days
have elapsed.
10. Patterns of employer discrimination are given a special status by the Act-
The provisions of the Civil Rights Act authorizing the Attorney General to bring
pattern or practice suits directly against an employer, see note 4 supra, became effec-
tive immediately upon enactment, although the rest of Title VII did not become
effective until July of 1965. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 716(a), 78
Stat. 266 (1964). Evidently, Congress considered patterns of discrimination by em-
ployers an evil of such magnitude that the financial resources of the government were
to be contributed toward their immediate eradication. See Walker, Title VII: Com-
plaint and Enforcement Procedures and Relief and Remedies, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM.
L. Rav. 495, 501 (1966).
It is possible that the courts have seized upon the term "pattern" as a license to
create "equitable modifications" to the provisions of the Act-specifically the limita-
tions period requiring timely filing with the EEOC. When other issues are raised in
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prior to filing of the complaint, the jurisdictional requirements of
Title VII are deemed satisfied, and the employer's liability is often
extended beyond the limitations period to encompass the whole
"act."" To the extent that employer liability is extended in this
manner, the requirement that charges must be filed with the EEOC
within 180 days has no effect.
Three significant problems currently surround the concept of
continuing violation. First is the considerable confusion that exists
over how to determine whether a "pattern of discrimination" exists
Title VII litigation, such as mootness, class standing, and relief, special priority is
given by the courts to "patterns" of discrimination. In Jenkins v. United Gas Corp.,
400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968), for example, the complainant alleged "plant-wide, system-
wide" racial discrimination primarily in the denial of promotions. Within a few weeks
after the charge was filed, the employer offered, and the aggrieved employee accepted,
the desired promotion. Nevertheless, the court refused to consider the action moot:
[Tihe charge itself is something more than the single claim that a particular
job has been denied [the complainant]. Rather it is necessarily a dual one:
(1) a specific job, promotion, etc. has actually been denied, and (2) this was
due to Title VII forbidden discrimination.
Considering that in this immediate field of labor relations what is small
in principal is often large in principle, element (2) has extreme importance
with heavy overtones of public interest. Whether in name or not, the suit is
perforce a sort of class action for fellow employees similarly situated.
Id. at 32-33 (footnote omitted); cf. Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1222
(9th Cir. 1971) (discontinuance of a job in controversy does not moot litigation where
discrimination in general company employment is alleged).
If a pattern or practice of employer discrimination is established, the courts do
not limit relief to those who were employees in the prescribed period prior to the filing
of the charge with the EEOC. "Thus, all persons presently subject to the alleged
discriminatory policies of the defendant and all persons who have in the past been so
subjected and continue to be affected by the same, are proper parties to this action."
Briggs v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 414 F. Supp. 371, 378 (E.D. Va. 1976).
One court has even found that when a pattern or practice is shown, an individual
complainant who is no longer directly affected by the employer's alleged discrimina-
tion and failed to file a charge on time, still may remain within the class of those
properly before the court. Kohn v. Royall, Koegel & Wells, 59 F.R.D. 515 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), appeal dismissed, 496 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir. 1974):
[The complainant's] individual grievance provides merely the springboard
from which to investigate the employer's alleged continuing violation with
respect to the class as a whole . . . . This result is not a perversion of the
class action device permitting an individual to revive a time barred claim
by asserting the grievances of others. Rather, it is a way of defining the
jurisdiction-conferring concept of continuing violation so as to carry out the
underlying purposes of the Act.
Id. at 578 (footnotes omitted). The court in Kohn also asserted that giving a pattern
of discrimination overriding importance in comparison with the limitations period of
the Act does not frustrate the purposes underlying the latter because a pattern of on-
going discrimination by its very nature is not a stale claim. Id. But see notes 116-24
infra and accompanying text.
11. See text accompanying notes 97-113 infra.
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in a given case. Second is the question of the doctrine's continuing
viability after the Supreme Court's recent decision in United Air
Lines, Inc. v. Evans.'2 In Evans, the Court considered the doctrine,
albeit indirectly, and seemed to indicate some disfavor with the en-
tire concept, thereby introducing an additional element of uncer-
tainty for courts charged with applying the doctrine. 3 Indeed, since
Evans, the lower courts have divided on the question of the doctrine's
enduring validity. Third, the continuing violation doctrine, as cur-
rently applied, can result in undue prejudice to employers by facili-
tating the extension of their liability to include acts that occurred
years earlier. Since the doctrine looks only to the existence of a
"pattern" to determine whether a violation continues and liability
should be extended, the policies behind the limitations period may
be overridden without explicit consideration.
This Note attempts to define a continuing violation by focusing
primarily on language used by the courts and the EEOC in describing
and applying the doctrine. Next follows an analysis of the potential
impact of United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans on the doctrine, pointing
out the problems of prejudice to employers that have arisen through
its application. Finally, the Note proposes an alternative to the pat-
tern analysis currently utilized by the courts, in an effort to lessen
the doctrine's prejudicial effects while preserving the flexibility nec-
essary to effectuate the purposes of Title VII.
II. THE CONTINUING VIOLATION DOCTRINE
The continuing violation doctrine serves two functions. First, its
application provides the courts with jurisdiction over the complaint
of an aggrieved employee that was not filed with the EEOC within
the statutory limitations period. Second, it imposes liability on an
employer for acts committed more than 180 days prior to the filing
of the complaint.
The first use of the doctrine is essentially an equitable, common
sense modification of the Act's time limitations for filing with the
EEOC 4 that seems clearly warranted in light of the fact that charges
12. 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
13. See text accompanying notes 77-85 infra.
14. The Supreme Court has not decided whether the limitations period of Title
VII is to be construed as an absolute jurisdictional bar or a jurisdictional requirement
subject to equitable modification. If the former, a court's jurisdiction under Title VII
would be limited solely to those acts of employer discrimination that occurred within
the limitations period. On the other hand, if the Title VII jurisdictional limitation is
considered to be analogous to jurisdictional limitations imposed by traditional statutes
of limitations it may properly be subject to equitable modifications, such as tolling.
Shell Oil Co. v. Dartt, 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976), aff'd per curiam by an equally
divided court, 434 U.S. 99 (1977), is instructive in this regard. In that case, the court
[Vol. 63:119
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of discrimination are most often filed by laypersons.' 5 The primary
focus of the courts in this context is whether the employee has alleged
enough information in the complaint to permit the inference of a
present violation. If no present violation can be inferred, the com-
plaint must be dismissed. If, however, the discrimination alleged is
not an isolated act but part of an ongoing policy of the employer still
in existence and affecting the employee, the violation alleged is con-
sidered to be "continuing" and the complaint is deemed timely.'"
Dismissal of the facially untimely complaint in such cases would be
a "futile gesture" since the employee could simply file another com-
plaint with the EEOC that would be timely filed. 7
held that the 180-day limitations period for the filing of a complaint under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1970), was jurisdictional
in a procedural sense and subject to equitable modification. The court relied on several
lower court opinions that had reached the same conclusion with respect to Title VII,
including Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924, 928 (5th Cir.
1975), and Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970).
Those courts that have found continuing violations have construed the limitations
period to be "jurisdictional" only in this latter, procedural sense, and have allowed it
to be circumvented when the violation alleged was continuing. See, e.g., Reeb. v.
Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924, 927 (5th Cir. 1975); Jamison v. Olga
Coal Co., 335 F. Supp. 454, 458 (S.D. W. Va. 1971); Sciaraffa v. Oxford Paper Co.,
310 F. Supp. 891, 896 (D. Me. 1970). In the view of these courts,
the timing provisions [of Title VII] will be subject to the same sort of
equitable modifications that are applied to statutes of limitations, with the
important additional requirement that these modifications will be applied
in the interest of effectuating the broad remedial purposes of the statute.
Thus, even in circumstances where a modification might be denied applica-
tion at the common law, the modification might still be applied if the court
felt that doing so would further the purposes of the statute considered as a
whole.
Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924, 927 (5th Cir. 1975).
15. See, e.g., EEOC v. Western Publishing Co., 502 F.2d 599, 602-03 (8th Cir.
1974) ("It is well established that lay complainants' charges are to be construed
broadly in a liberal manner in order to effect the 'remedial and humanitarian under-
pinnings of Title VII and the crucial role played by the private litigant in the statutory
scheme.' ") (quoting Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 460 (5th Cir.
1970)).
16. See, e.g., Cox v. United States Gypsum Co., 409 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1969);
Hecht v. Cooperative Am. Relief Everywhere, 351 F. Supp. 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)(dic-
tum); Moreman v. Georgia Power Co., 310 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ga. 1969); Culpepper
v. Reynolds Metals Co., 296 F. Supp. 1232 (N.D. Ga. 1968), rev'd on other grounds,
421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970); Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 46 F.R.D. 442 (N.D. Ga.
1968).
17. [Wjhen it is obvious that a Title VII plaintiff is complaining of
discriminatory hiring, promotion, or transfer practices, it would seem to be
a needless, futile gesture to require that plaintiff to make a formal reapplica-
tion for the desired position, simply because the EEOC complaint was not
filed within 180 . . . days of the initial application.
Cisson v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 392 F. Supp. 1176, 1181 (N.D. Ga. 1975). See also
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The second function of the continuing violation doctrine-
imposing liability upon an employer for acts committed beyond the
limitations period-is not primarily concerned with whether or not a
present violation is alleged. A present violation is assumed and the
issue becomes whether the present and past acts of the employer
can be viewed as one overall act that warrants imposition of liability
for all violations.1
The definitions of a continuing violation that have been formu-
lated by the courts do not distinguish between these two functions,
but rather focus solely on the nature of the discriminatory acts al-
leged. For example, one court's definition excludes the mere
"mechanical consequences" of an employer's act and includes an
"affirmative perpetuation" by the employer of the original discrimi-
nation. 9 A more succinct, though still ambiguous, definition is that
a continuing violation includes any "pattern" of discrimination on
the part of the employer but not any specific act."0 The EEOC ap-
proaches the continuing violation in a similar manner through what
it calls the "Policy/Policy-Application Distinction":
A Charging Party may attack a current employment policy, in addi-
tion to past applications of that policy; and, since a policy is by
nature continuing, a "policy" charge always is timely filed ....
Charges which do not specifically include the work [sic] "pol-
icy", or otherwise suggest a continuing course of conduct, normally
may be read, in context, to allege a continuing, i.e., policy-type,
violation."
If a court finds a "pattern" of discrimination, it may assume that the
discriminatory acts of the employer continue into the present and
that the liability of the employer may properly be extended into the
past. Unfortunately, however, mere invocation of the word "pattern"
does not decide particular cases, and no clear guidelines have been
Egleston v. State Univ. College, 535 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1976); EEOC v. Rinella &
Rinella, 401 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Kohn v. Royall, Koegel & Wells, 59 F.R.D.
515 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), appeal dismissed, 496 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir. 1974) (order not appeala-
ble); Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 46 F.R.D. 442, 444 (N.D. Ga. 1968)("[O]ne
isolated incident is not being challenged but rather an entire allegedly discriminatory
system. In such a situation, there is an alleged continual violation; therefore, filing
within a specified time is not required to bring the action before this Court.").
18. Extending employer liability beyond the limitations period of the Act raises
questions that require a deliberate inquiry into the competing policies behind the Act's
limitations period and its substantive provisions. See notes 118-124 infra and accompa-
nying text.
19. Kennan v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 721, 726 (N.D. Cal.
1976).
20. See Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 46 F.R.D. 442, 444 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
21. EEOC COWL. MAN. (CCH) 4101 (EEOC Compliance Manual § 208.1).
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developed by the courts for determining when a "pattern" exists.22
An analysis of the various judicial approaches used in continuing
violation determinations, however, reveals a number of factors which,
when viewed together, aid in determining the showing necessary for
finding a "pattern." The first of these factors is inherent in the con-
cept of a "pattern" itself. Clearly, the word "pattern" implies more
than one discriminatory act. An isolated act, such as a refusal to
hire,n a termination, 4 a transfer, 5 or a demotion, 26 is not itself a
continuing violation. Even if an employer retains a discriminatory
attitude toward his employees, this, without more, will not convert a
single discriminatory act into a continuing violation. 21
When two or more discriminatory acts sufficient to constitute a
pattern are found, a continuing violation still will not exist unless at
least one of the acts in the pattern occurred within the 180-day limi-
tations period.28 An employee who alleges several discriminatory
acts-for example, general harassment, denial of transfer requests,
and demeaning work assignments-still must establish to the satis-
faction of a court that at least one of the acts occurred within the
limitations period or the court will dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 2
Thus, an employer who abandons a certain discriminatory policy
more than 180 days before a complaint is filed and commits no fur-
ther discriminatory acts will be free from the threat of any charge
22. The Eighth Circuit's continuing violation test is a good example of how
nebulous the inquiry can be:
We do not purport to construct an acid test as to what may or may not
constitute "compelling circumstances" sufficient to warrant a finding of
"continuing" discrimination. Each case must be decided upon its own facts
with the ultimate result depending upon the complainant's ability to carry
his evidentiary burden.
Richard v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 469 F.2d 1249, 1253 (8th Cir. 1972), cited with
approval in Olson v. Rembrandt Printing Co., 511 F.2d 1228, 1234 (8th Cir. 1975).
23. See, e.g., Smith v. OEO, 538 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1976); Molybdenum Corp.
v. EEOC, 457 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
24. See, e.g., King v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 538 F.2d 581 (4th Cir. 1976);
Olson v. Rembrandt Printing Co., 511 F.2d 1228 (8th Cir. 1975); Higginbottom v.
Home Centers, Inc., 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5371 (N.D. Ohio 1975).
25. See, e.g., Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 350 F. Supp. 529 (S.D. Tex.
1972); Younger v. Glamorgan Pipe & Foundry Co., 310 F. Supp. 195 (W.D. Va. 1969).
26. See, e.g,, Cisson v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 392 F. Supp. 1176 (N.D. Ga.
1975); Gordon v. Baker Protective Serv., Inc., 358 F. Supp. 867 (N.D. ll. 1973).
27. See Younger v. Glamorgan Pipe & Foundry Co., 310 F. Supp. 195, 197 (W.D.
Va. 1969) ("regardless of what precipitated" the conduct it becomes final when limita-
tions period passes).
28. See, e.g., Wallace v. International Paper Co., 426 F. Supp. 352, 354 (W.D.
La. 1977) (origination of acts only and not entire conduct may extend beyond the 180-
day period).
29. Loo v. Gerarge, 374 F. Supp. 1338, 1339-40 (D. Hawaii 1974). See also Alle-
man v. T.R.W., Inc., 419 F. Supp. 625, 626, 629-30 (M.D. Pa. 1976).
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under Title VI.30
But even a series of discriminatory acts, one of which occurred
within 180 days of filing, is not sufficient to constitute a "pattern."
The third necessary element is some logical interrelationship between
these acts.' To find such an interrelationship, the courts have looked
to three basic linking "themes": (1) repetition of a discriminatory act
over time, (2) the continuing existence of an employment relation-
ship, and (3) the perpetuation of past effects by present discrimina-
tory acts.32 Although occasionally a continuing violation will be found
by virtue of only one of these themes, both repetition over time and
an ongoing employment relationship 'generally must be found in order
to establish the interrelationship between discriminatory acts that is
necessary to find a continuing violation.31 Perpetuation of past effects
30. See Campbell v. A.C. Petersen Farms, Inc., 69 F.R.D. 457 (D. Conn. 1975)
(racially discriminatory grooming standards phased out more than 300 days before
filing of the complaint with the EEOC).
31. A pattern of discrimination cannot exist, even when two discriminatory acts
are shown, if the connection between them is random. A pattern is "the largest unit
of classification. . . constituting a group of phases having several distinguishing and
fundamental features in common .... " WEBSTER'S NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONAY
1657 (3d unabridged ed. 1976).
32. These "themes" may be seen as factors that can be used to link past acts
with present violations. One authority has suggested a different approach, viewing the
cases as fitting within three independent categories determined by specific factual
contexts. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 884-908 (1976).
These categories are: (1) a series of independent discriminatory acts one of which
occurred within the filing period; (2) the maintenance of a system of discrimination;
and (3) the existence of present effects of past discrimination. Id. It is not clear from
the classification just where a "series of independent actions" ends, and a "system of
discrimination" begins, however, and the authors themselves recognize that the con-
tinuing violation doctrine "pose[s] very difficult line drawing problems," id. at 884.
This lack of clarity was recognized in Elliott v. Sperry Rand Corp., No. 4-74-Civ. 627
(D. Minn., July 12, 1978) (motion to amend class certification granted), where the
court used the framework suggested by Schlei and Grossman, but noted that "the cases
rarely fall neatly into one category or another and there may be additional methods of
categorizing the cases . . . ." Id. at 4.
Rather than attempt to fit a given practice within a specific category, the "theme"
approach suggested by this Note concentrates on factors that may be used to determine
whether a continuing violation exists. Although there may be "line drawing" problems
with the "theme" analysis, as well, this approach may nevertheless be preferable since
it facilitates consideration of the interrelationship of the factors.
33. The only exception to this rule comes from those cases that have found a
continuing violation based on repeated requests for employment or reemployment that
are discriminatorily refused. See notes 44-45 infra and accompanying text. At least one
court, however, has stated that the existence of an ongoing employment relationship
is a prerequisite to finding a continuing violation: "While the continuing discrimina-
tion theory may be available to present employees. . . we do not think it has validity
when asserted by a former employee." Olson v. Rembrandt Printing Co., 511 F.2d 1228,
1234 (8th Cir. 1975).
An excellent example of the manner in which courts search for linking themes is
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by present discriminatory acts plays a more supportive, less determi-
native role.34
A. REPETITION OF DISCRIMINATORY AcTs OVER TIME
The repetition of discriminatory acts over a period of time is the
clearest indicator of a "pattern" of discrimination. Repetition is often
the result of a particular policy adopted by the employer that, when
enforced on an ongoing basis, produces a series of discriminatory acts.
Indeed, most cases in which continuing violations have been found
involve ongoing implementation of discriminatory promotion,35
transfer," hiring,37 or testing"8 policies.
The significance and meaning of repetition has been clouded,
however, by cases involving an employer's failure to remedy a single
past discriminatory act. The courts have exhibited a certain amount
of confusion in attempting to decide whether such a failure is more
properly viewed as an isolated act and therefore irremediable, or as
Tarvesian v. Carr Div. TRW, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 336 (D. Mass. 1976). In Tarvesian,
the plaintiff, "an American of Armenian extraction," id. at 337, claimed a discrimina-
tory termination by his employer on the grounds that he had received a salary lower
than normal for his position, was told by his supervisor that "there was no future for
an Armenian in a 'Yankee outfit,' " id. at 338, and was replaced by an employee with
less work experience. The charge alleging this discriminatory termination was un-
timely filed with the EEOC. The plaintiff also alleged, however, a discriminatory and
malicious reference by the employer that occurred after his termination. This charge
was timely filed. The court sought to determine whether the untimely and timely
claims of the employee formed an "integrated pattern" of discrimination. Id. at 339.
After considering all three "themes" mentioned above, it concluded that no "pattern"
existed. First, no employment relationship continued between the plaintiff and defen-
dant because of the termination. Second, the effects of the termination were not
perpetuated by the adverse reference; the plaintiff no longer "actively suffered the
effects . . . at the time of. . . suit." Id. Third, the discrimination did not extend
without interruption beyond the limitations period, presumably because the termina-
tion, and the acts surrounding it, occurred only once and were not repeated on a
continual basis. The court concluded that "[i]n this case no analogous theme unites
the alleged discriminatory acts of the defendants into a continuous pattern. The claims
growing out of actions taken during plaintiff's employment are stale. The allegation
of acts of a totally different nature occurring many months later cannot freshen them."
Id. at 340.
34. See notes 66-67 infra and accompanying text.
35. See e.g., Noble v. University of Rochester, 535 F.2d 756 (2d Cir. 1976); Cates
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6144 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Franczek v.
Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1005 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
36. See, e.g., Lattimore v. Loews Theatres, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 1397 (M.D.N.C.
1975); Jamison v. Olga Coal Co., 335 F. Supp. 454 (S.D.W. Va. 1971).
37. See, e.g., Watson v. Limbach Co., 333 F. Supp. 754 (S.D. Ohio 1971); Logan
v. General Fireproofing Co., 309 F. Supp. 1096 (W.D.N.C. 1969).
38. Franczek v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1005 (E.D. Mich.
1974); Watson v. Limbach Co., 333 F. Supp. 754 (S.D. Ohio 1971).
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an affirmative policy of nonaction and therefore a continuing viola-
tion. For example, in Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co.," a federal
district court in Georgia held that the failure of an employer to award
a job to a black employee who had seniority was not a continuing
violation. The court stated, "[TIhere is no known authority to the
effect that a failure to rectify an alleged unlawful act converts it into
a continuing transaction or suspends the [limitation] period."4 Re-
peating this language in Hutchings v. United States Industries,
Inc.,' another court found that a failure to restore a job classification
that was discriminatorily refused the plaintiff was not a continuing
violation.
In Moreman v. Georgia Power Co.,42 however, decided only a few
months after Culpepper, the same federal district court in Georgia
found that the failure of a union to reword a collective bargaining
contract to delete certain discriminatory employment practices was
a continuing violation. The provisions of a union contract arguably
may be more "continuous" in nature than a single refusal to promote
an employee, since they remain in effect on a daily basis,43 but under
the reasoning in Culpepper and Hutchings it still was open for the
court in Moreman to view the union's failure to reword the agreement
as a single act that did not continue. The somewhat contradictory
results of these cases suggest that it is not easy to discern whether a
failure to act constitutes a single act or an affirmative policy of non-
action.
In addition to finding a continuing violation based on action or
failure to act, in some instances, the courts have found a continuing
violation when the actions of an employee caused an employer to
repeat discriminatory acts over time. For example, an ongoing dis-
criminatory refusal to reconsider a denial of tenure has been held
sufficient to constitute a pattern.4 Similarly, renewal of an applica-
tion for a job can convert an original discriminatory refusal to hire
into a continuing violation.45 One court, however, has taken a position
contrary to this approach. In Davidson v. Tapley,46 the court held
39. 296 F. Supp. 1232 (N.D. Ga. 1969), rev'd and remanded on other grounds,
421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970).
40. Id. at 1235.
41. 309 F. Supp. 691, 693 (E.D. Tex. 1969).
42. 310 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
43. See also Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1006 (1971); Norman v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 414 F.2d 73 (8th Cir. 1969); Glus
v. G. C. Murphy Co., 329 F. Supp. 563 (W.D. Pa. 1971), Longshoremen Local 329 v.
South Atl. Gulf Coast Dist., 295 F. Supp. 599 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
44. Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1975) (employee requested
reconsideration by tenure committee).
45. Logan v. General Fireproofing Co., 309 F. Supp. 1096 (W.D.N.C. 1969).
46. 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6074 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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that an allegation that repeated requests for reemployment had been
made and discriminatorily refused could not revive an original dis-
criminatory termination. The court stated that "the legislative inten-
tion to establish a reasonable statute of limitations may not be frus-
trated by giving plaintiff a perpetual right to litigate a time-barred
claim." 7 One reason for this difference in approach may be that, al-
though the linking "theme" of repetition of discriminatory conduct
over time was present in Davidson, the "theme" of a continuing
employment relationship was not.
B. THE CONTINUING EXISTENCE OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
The "link" between discriminatory acts provided by an employ-
ment relationship is regarded as a strong one by the courts. Although
an ongoing employment relationship is not enough to render a single
act continuing, a pattern of discrimination may be found so long as
two separate discriminatory acts have some connection, even a most
tenuous one. In Cox v. United States Gypsum Co.,"5 for example,
three employees charged their employer with a discriminatory layoff.
The charge was untimely filed and contained no additional claim of
discrimination, although it referred to the layoff as "continuing." The
court found that "under the circumstances of this case and in the
light of the purposes of the act," it was appropriate to read the charge
as also claiming a discriminatory recall. 9 Since the right to be re-
called preserved the employees' relationship to the employer and
existed at the time the charge was filed, the court found that discrim-
ination continued into the present and the charge was therefore
timely.
The "link" provided by an ongoing employment relationship is
also a factor in finding a pattern of discrimination in retirement
plans. In this context, the complainant generally is not an active
employee and there is no continuity in the employment relationship
itself. The "pattern" of discrimination is strengthened simply by the
contractual obligation of the employer to pay retirement benefits. For
example, in Bartmess v. Drewrys U.S.A., Inc., 11 an employee filed a
charge with the EEOC four and one-half months before her retire-
47. Id. at 6076.
48. 409 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1969).
49. Id. at 290.
[L]ayoff, as distinguished from discharge or quitting, suggests a possibility
of reemployment . . . . The record shows that the company had bound
itself, by its collective bargaining agreement, to consider seniority in making
a recall, and the agreement provides that an employee does not lose seniority
by reason of layoff until one year has expired . . ..
Id. at 290-91.
50. 444 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971).
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ment date, alleging that her employer's retirement plan was discrimi-
natory because it mandated a retirement age of 62 for female employ-
ees and 65 for males. The employer and the employee's union main-
tained that the claim was not timely filed because the statute re-
quired that charges be filed within 90 days after the occurrence of
alleged unlawful employment practices, and the employee had not
waited until after her retirement to file the claim. The court dis-
agreed, holding that the mere presence of the discriminatory retire-
ment plan in the collective bargaining agreement constituted a viola-
tion "within the meaning of Title VII and would continue to do so
for the entire time the individual was employed."5 ' This language
seems to require that an aggrieved individual be employed for the
violation to continue.2 Such a reading would avoid the problem of
perpetual liability. "
This limitation, however, was not imposed in Mixson v. South-
ern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.54 In Mixson, a male employee
died at the age of 59 years and 10 months, ineligible for benefits under
a pension plan that fixed retirement age at 60 for males and 55 for
females. The court held that the decedent's widow had a timely claim
even though she did not file within the limitations period following
his death. The court reasoned that as long as the widow alleged that
the pension plan existed both currently and at the time of her hus-
band's death, the filing was timely. Thus, so long as the company
maintained the plan, she presumably could file at any time in the
future.
American Finance System, Inc. v. Harlow55 adopted a similar
position. In that case, the court held that a continuing violation ex-
isted so long as final distribution of a former employee's benefits from
a discriminatory pension fund had not been made by the employer.
The employee therefore was not required to file a charge with the
EEOC within the applicable limitations period after termination of
his employment, but was free to raise the claim at any future date
51. Id. at 1188.
52. Bartmess also received this interpretation in B. SCHLI & P. GROSSMAN, supra
note 32, at 902.
53. Cf. McCarty v. Boeing Co., 321 F. Supp. 260 (W.D. Wash. 1970), where a
Washington district court evidently took the view that when a former employee merely
is receiving retirement benefits, the employment relationship has become so atten-
uated that no pattern of discrimination can be found even though the payments from
the employer were made on a regular monthly basis. The court ruled that in such a
case the complainant must file charges with the EEOC within the applicable limita-
tions period after receiving the first payment. Otherwise, "aggrieved persons could well
assert their claim fifteen, twenty, or thirty years hence." Id. at 261.
54. 334 F. Supp. 525 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
55. 65 F.R.D. 94 (D. Md. 1974).
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prior to final distribution."
These cases indicate that the concept of an employment relation-
ship is extremely broad. A complainant need not be an actual, work-
ing employee. He is free to challenge an employer's discriminatory
acts from the "outside" without regard to the statutory limitations
period so long as the employer retains a contractual obligation to
him.
C. PERPETUATION OF PAST EFECTs BY PRESENT AcTs
A third theme that may serve to link together an employer's
discriminatory acts is the perpetuation of the effects of past acts by
present discriminatory acts. "The rationale underlying the allowance
of actions for continuing discrimination is to provide a remedy for
past actions which operate to discriminate against the complainant
at the present time."57 The ordinary effects that follow any discrimi-
natory act are not enough to supply this link. If the contrary were
true, any employee who suffered continuing adverse effects from an
isolated act of discrimination would be free to litigate at any time by
claiming a continuing violation." The courts have consistently held
that an isolated discriminatory act does not continue, even if its
effects do."
The perpetuation of past effects by present acts refers instead to
present discriminatory acts that, by their nature, contain or "lock in"
the effects of past acts. This "lock in" analysis originated in Griggs
v. Duke Power Co.,"0 the Supreme Court's first major pronouncement
on the meaning and scope of Title VII.5 ' Prior to the enactment of
Title VII, the employer in Griggs openly discriminated on the basis
56. The Harlow court expressly rejected the reasoning of McCarty v. Boeing Co.,
321 F. Supp. 260 (W.D. Wash. 1970):
As for McCarty v. Boeing. . .it is apparent that this decision was unsup-
ported by the vast majority of the precedent on the question which is re-
flected by the lack of pertinent citation in the opinion. Furthermore, other
courts have denigrated the importance of strict enforcement of the limita-
tions period when the employer implements a wide-spread system of discrim-
ination in violation of Title VII.
65 F.R.D. at 103.
57. Olson v. Rembrandt Printing Co., 511 F.2d 1228, 1234 (8th Cir. 1975).
58. Of course, every past act of discrimination may have some future
impact, and certainly the "sins of the fathers" are often perpetuated. As a
result, a broad extension of the continuing discrimination concept would
arguably permit a lawsuit to be commenced irrespective of when the alleged
discrimination occurred, thereby completely eliminating any period of limi-
tations for Title VII actions.
Cisson v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 392 F. Supp. 1176, 1181 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
59. See notes 23-26 supra and accompanying text.
60. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
61. See Jones, The Development of the Law under Title VII Since 1965: Implica-
tions of the New Law, 30 RUTGERS L. Rav. 1, 1-6 (1976).
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of race in hiring and assigning employees. On the day Title VII be-
came effective, the employer instituted a policy of testing that,
though neutral on its face, had the effect of continuing the employer's
pre-Act discriminatory hiring and assignment practices. The Court
held that the testing policy perpetuated the employer's discrimina-
tion and bore no relation to measuring job capability. It therefore
constituted a present violation of Title VII.62
Essential to the result in Griggs was the Court's conclusion that
Congress did not intend Title VII to permit employers to assume that
the status quo at the time the Act was passed was the starting point
from which any alleged discriminatory act would be measured.
"Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face,
and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they
operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment
practices."63 With this foundation, Griggs held that a present act that
perpetuates pre-Act discrimination was a present violation of Title
VII. And although the employer's liability in Griggs extended only to
his present act of discrimination and not beyond the effective date
of the Act, the Court's decision nevertheless operated to remedy a
discriminatory structure that existed before the passage of the Act.
Since Griggs, some courts have viewed the "lock in" theory as
another "theme" that can bind an employer's discriminatory acts
into a "pattern" for the purpose of finding a continuing violation.
This theme has been used, for example, to justify a finding of a
continuing violation when a discriminatory recall perpetuated the
discriminatory effects of a layoff, 4 and when failure to change a dis-
criminatory retirement system perpetuated a discriminatory age
differentiation based on sex.6 5 These cases, however, did not rely
solely on the theme of perpetuation of past effects. They also clearly
pointed out that a contractual relationship, however tenuous, existed
between the employer and the employee. 6 The perpetuation theory,
therefore, was relied on only as a supplemental linking theme to
establish the required interrelationship.67
62. 401 U.S. at 432.
63. Id. at 429-30.
64. Tippet v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 316 F. Supp. 292 (M.D.N.C. 1970).
65. American Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Harlow, 65 F.R.D. 94, 103 (D. Md. 1974)
("[C]ontinuing problems of bias only toll the limitations period .. where the unlaw-
ful practices have a present and recurring effect .... ").
66. See, e.g., id. at 104 ("And like the plaintiffs challenging discriminatory lay-
offs and promotion policies, the possibility always exists of a change in the terms of
the ongoing relationship if the purported bias [in the discriminatory retirement plan]
is voluntarily eliminated. . . ").
67. It is difficult to see how an employer's present act can perpetuate or "lock
in" the effects of a past act once the employment relationship has been severed.
Seemingly, the "lock in" will occur only within that relationship. Once it is termi-
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D. SUMMARY
The linking themes of repetition over time, continuation of the
employment relationship, and perpetuation of past effects of discrim-
ination by present acts seem to be all-encompassing; any discrimina-
tory series of acts or affirmative policy by an employer within an
employment relationship is likely to feature one or more of the
themes and be deemed a continuing violation. Even two acts con-
nected only by rights embodied in an employment contract may con-
stitute a continuing violation."
The only situation in which the continuing violation doctrine has
not been applied is where an employment relationship has been se-
vered and only two discriminatory acts are alleged-one while the
complainant was an employee (untimely) and one after employment
was terminated (timely). For example, a wrongful termination (un-
timely complained of) followed by a discriminatory refusal to rehire
(timely complained of) does not constitute a continuing violation. 9
Nor does a termination followed by an unjustified adverse recommen-
dation establish a pattern sufficient to make the employer liable for
both acts."
The result in these cases may turn on the fact that when repeti-
tion of a discriminatory act cannot be found and the employment
relationship has been severed, the prejudice an employer may suffer
from the bringing of stale claims is likely to be most acute. It seems
arguable, however, that even where a "pattern" of discrimination
clearly exists, an employer also may suffer unwarranted prejudice
from the bringing of stale claims. The "pattern" analysis currently
used by the courts not only precludes consideration of this possibility
but may result in making it a reality. The problems involved in
applying the continuing violation doctrine without expressly consid-
ering prejudice to the employer is exemplified in United Air Lines,
Inc. v. Evans.7
III. THE POTENTIAL EFFECT OF UNITED AIR LINES; INC.
v. EVANS ON THE CONTINUING VIOLATION DOCTRINE
Carolyn Evans, a flight attendant, was forced to resign from
nated, adverse effects may continue but only in the sense that the effects of a discrimi-
natory act always may be personally felt. Thus, these two "links" necessarily overlap.
A problem arises, however, when a terminated employee is "rehired." See text
accompanying notes 72-81 infra (discussing United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S.
553 (1977)).
68. See notes 48-49 supra and accompanying text.
69. See notes 46-47 supra and accompanying text.
70. See Tarvesian v. Carr Div. TRW, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 336 (D. Mass. 1976).
71. 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
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United Air Lines because of her marriage. In a subsequent lawsuit to
which she was not a party, United's policy was held violative of Title
VII. 7 Four years after her forced resignation, Evans was rehired by
United, and a year later she filed a complaint with the EEOC alleging
continuing discrimination as a result of United's seniority policies,
which provided that only continuous time-in-serivce was counted for
seniority. Because Evans' service had been interrupted, she lost all
seniority accrued during her previous term of employment. This re-
sult, she claimed, perpetuated the effects of the original discrimina-
torily forced resignation and, in itself, amounted to a violation of
Title VII. Evans sued to recover lost seniority and back pay from the
date of her original forced resignation.
In order to succeed, Evans had to make two separate showings.
First, it was necessary to show that the seniority system was a present
violation of Title VII. The five-year-old discriminatory discharge, by
itself, was not actionable because the continuing violation doctrine
has never held an isolated discriminatory act, without more, to be
continuing. 7 Evans argued, however, that the seniority system con-
stituted a present violation of Title VII because it perpetuated the
effects of the original discharge. Even if this were so, the problem
remained that her charge concerning the seniority system had not
been filed with the EEOC until a year after she was rehired, after the
limitations period had run. Evans' second showing, then, had to be
that the seniority system was an ongoing, continuing policy of United
and that, as in cases concerning similar policies of hiring, transfer,
or testing that constituted continuing violations," expiration of the
limitations period for filing had no preclusive effect. Had Evans suc-
ceeded with this second showing, she could have claimed that the
proper remedy for the violation was back pay for the two years pre-
ceding the filing of the charges and seniority credit all the way back
to the original termination.75
72. See Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 991 (1971).
73. See notes 23-27 supra and accompanying text.
74. See notes 35-38 supra and accompanying text.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970) limits the recovery of backpay by providing in
relevant part:
[Tihe court may .. order such affirmative action as may be appropriate,
which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employ-
ees, with. . . back pay. . . . Back pay liability shall not accrue from a date
more than two years prior to the filing of a charge with the Commission.
See United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 561 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"As to post-1965 [conduct] . . . 'liability exists . . . for practices occurring after
the effective date of the Act. . . and accrues only from a date two years prior to the
filing of charges with the EEOC.' "Miller v. Miami Prefabricators, Inc., 438 F. Supp.
176, 182 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 410
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The Seventh Circuit found that Evans had made her two show-
ings but refused to extend her relief back to the original termination.
Relief was granted from the date that United rehired her.7" The Su-
preme Court reversed, finding that Evans had not successfully made
her first showing; the seniority system was not a present violation of
Title VII."1 Furthermore, since the original forced resignation was not
a present violation, neither alleged discriminatory act could support
a finding of a continuing violation. Hence, the Court concluded that
Evans had no cause of action under Title VII.
The most potentially significant and problematic aspect of the
Evans opinion is the Court's response to Evans' argument that the
seniority system-the alleged present discriminatory act-per-
petuated the effects of her discriminatory termination. The Court
stated:
Respondent is correct in pointing out that the seniority system
gives present effect to a past act of discrimination. But United was
entitled to treat that past act as lawful after respondent failed to file
a charge of discrimination within the 90 days then allowed .... A
discriminatory act which is not made the basis for a timely charge
is the legal equivalent of a discriminatory act which occurred before
the statute was passed. It may constitute relevant background evi-
dence in a proceeding in which the status of a current practice is at
issue, but separately considered, it is merely an unfortunate event
in history which has no present legal consequences.
Respondent emphasizes the fact that she has alleged a
n.3 (1975)). In Miller the court construed the two year limit on backpay recovery as
applying only after the court had determined the full extent of injury suffered by
employees. Id.
76. Evans v. United Air Lines, Inc., 534 F.2d 1247, 1251 (7th Cir. 1976).
77. 431 U.S. at 558; cf. Kennan v. Pan Am World Airways, 424 F. Supp. 721
(N.D. Cal. 1976), where the court refused to conclude that a seniority system could be
viewed as an ongoing system of discrimination so that a charge could be filed any time
while one was being denied retroactive seniority; the seniority system was to be viewed
as a single act thnt orcurred when the employee was laid off.
78. If Evans' charge had been considered timely, it would have been necessary
for the court to determine what past, untiiely acts the employer should be held liable
for under the continuing violation doctrine. It could have been argued that the past
discriminatory termination followed by rehiring and the maintenance of the discrimi-
natory seniority system established a pattern of discrimination sufficient to make the
employer liable for the whole. With this application of the continuing violation doc-
trine, Evans thus could have obtained what she sought-retroactive seniority from the
date of the discriminatory termination in 1968.
Before Evans was decided, however, no court that found a seniority system to be
a present violation of Title VII was also willing to conclude that a pattern of discrimi-
nation was thereby established, making an employer liable for the whole of its unlawful
conduct. In fact, the court in Kennan v. Pan Am. World Airways, 424 F. Supp. 721
(N.D. Cal. 1976), expressly rejected this approacl. See note 77 supra.
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continuing violation. United's seniority system does indeed have a
continuing impact on her pay and fringe benefits. But the emphasis
should not be placed on mere continuity; the critical question is
whether any present violation exists. 9
Apparently, the Court's conclusions that such acts are the equivalent
of pre-Act discrimination" and that an otherwise neutral seniority
system cannot "continue" an untimely filed charge,' are based on its
79. 431 U.S. at 558 (emphasis in original).
80. The holding of Evans was expressed in its companion case, International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), as follows: "Evans holds that
the operation of a seniority system is not unlawful under Title VII even though it
perpetuates post-Act discrimination that has not been the subject of a timely charge
by the discriminatee." Id. at 348 n.30 (emphasis added). The Court then concluded
in Teamsters that a seniority system that perpetuates post-Act discrimination is not
violative of Title VII even though a timely charge has been filed. Id.
81. The argument rejected by the Court-that a seniority system can violate
Title VII by perpetuating the effects of past discrimination-was essentially a product
of two prior Supreme Court cases, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971),
discussed at notes 60-63 supra and accompanying text, and Franks v. Bowman Transp.
Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
In Griggs, the Court concluded that any employer practice, even if neutral on its
face, was a present violation of Title VII if it perpetuated the effects of past discrimina-
tion. 401 U.S. at 429-30. In Evans the seniority system admittedly perpetuated the
effects of the past wrongful termination, 431 U.S. at 558, and under Griggs, it therefore
seemed to violate Title VII. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 349 (1977).
The factor that precluded extending the Griggs perpetuation theory to seniority
systems was section 703(h) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970), which exempts
bona fide seniority systems from Title VII coverage:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards
of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment
pursuant to a bona fide seniority . . . system . . . provided that such differ-
ences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin ....
Without exception, however, lower courts and the EEOC had held that section
703(h) did not apply to seniority systems that perpetuated the effects of prior discrimi-
nation. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 378-80
nn.2-5 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Moreover, Franks
v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976), seemed to suggest that this was the
position the Supreme Court also would adopt. The question in Franks was whether
section 703(h) barred a grant of retroactive seniority to job applicants who had been
the victims of racially discriminatory hiring practices. The Court concluded that the
relief was not barred even when the seniority system was neutral on its face:
[I]t is apparent that the thrust of the section is directed toward defining
what is and what is not an illegal discriminatory practice in instances in
which the post-Act operation of a seniority system is challenged as perpetu-
ating the effects of discrimination occurring prior to the effective date of the
Act. There is no indication in the legislative materials that § 703(h) was
intended to modify or restrict relief otherwise appropriate once an illegal
discriminatory practice occurring after the effective date of the Act is proved
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view that a seniority system is not a present violation of the Act
merely because it perpetuates the effects of untimely filed acts of
discrimination.
It should be noted that the primary question in Evans was
whether the seniority system was a present violation of Title VII.
Since it was not, the Court had no need to address any other aspect
of the continuing violation doctrine " and the language quoted above
was clearly incidental to the Court's result. This conclusion is
strengthened by the fact that in Evans' companion case, Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, the Court con-
cluded that bona fide seniority systems are not violations of Title
VII regardless of whether they perpetuate the effects of pre or post
Act discrimination." Therefore, the fact that the Court in Evans
viewed an untimely claimed violation as pre-Act discrimination
made no difference to the outcome of the case; even if the violation
had been viewed as post-Act discrimination, the seniority system,
Id. at 761-62. The Court also stressed the "make whole" objective of Title VII toward
victims of employment discrimination, id. at 764, and seemed to be heading toward a
restricted view of the applicability of section 703(h).
This, at least, was the interpretation given Franks by the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals in Evans v. United Air Lines, Inc., 534 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 431
U.S. 324 (1977). Initially, that court had refused to invalidate United's seniority sys-
tem, 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976), but it reversed
its position in light of Franks. Franks was read as interpreting section 703(h) to protect
only seniority systems that perpetuated pre-Act discrimination. Since Evans' original
discriminatory termination occurred post-Act, it did not apply. 534 F.2d at 1251.
In reversing the Seventh Circuit Court, the Supreme Court sharply disagreed with
this reading of Franks. The Court stressed that, although section 703(h) does not bar
a grant of retroactive seniority, it does prevent a facially neutral seniority system from
being treated as a present violation of Title VII, even though the seniority system may
perpetuate pre-Act discrimination. See notes 79-80 supra and accompanying text. The
Court also disagreed with the Seventh Circuit in viewing Evans' claim of a discrimina-
tory termination that occurred four years after passage of the Act, solely as post-Act
discrimination: "A discriminatory act which is not made the basis for a timely charge
is the legal equivalent of a discriminatory act which accrued before the statute was
passed." 431 U.S. at 558. Thus, under Evans, United's seniority system was not a
present violation of Title VI, even though it perpetuated the effects of past discrimi-
nation, because of the special protection afforded bona fide seniority systems by sec-
tion 703(h).
82. When [Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976)] reached
this Court, the issues relating to the timeliness of the charge and the viola-
tion of Title VII had already been decided; we dealt only with a question of
remedy. In contrast, in the case now before us we do not reach any remedy
issue because respondent did not file a timely charge based on her 1968
separation and she has not alleged facts establishing a violation since she was
rehired in 1972.
431 U.S. at 559 (footnotes omitted).
83. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
84. Id. at 348 n.30.
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which merely perpetuated its effects, would not have been violative
of Title VII. Nevertheless, the Court's statement that an untimely
complained of discriminatory act is "the legal equivalent of a dis-
criminatory act which occurred before the statute was passed," may
have significant consequences for the continuing violation doctrine,
for all courts agree that Title VII applies only prospectively; pre-Act
discrimination is not actionable s If untimely filed claims of dis-
crimination equal pre-Act discrimination, an employer will not be
liable for them. Yet this often is exactly what the continuing viola-
tion doctrine has accomplished by making an employer liable for un-
timely filed claims of discrimination if that discrimination formed a
"pattern" with present discriminatory acts.
If the Evans dictum is broadly read, the only use of the continu-
ing violation doctrine that will remain open to the courts is liberal
construction of a layperson's untimely charge with the EEOC to
avoid dismissing a complaint completely." For example, an untimely
charge of a discriminatory practice of testing would allege a continu-
ing violation in that it would permit a court to infer the actual use of
the discriminatory test within the limitations period, but the court
would not be able to hold the employer liable for the entire discrimi-
natory practice. This, by the reasoning of Evans, would be an imposi-
tion of liability for the equivalent of pre-Act discrimination. More-
over, by further extending the Evans analysis, it even can be argued
that an employer who carries on a systematic, ongoing, day-to-day
discriminatory policy cannot be held liable for the whole of it, but
only for that period 180 days prior to the filing of the charge."
Lower court decisions since Evans have been mixed as to the
appropriate interpretation of the Court's dictum. In Caldwell v. Sea-
85. See, e.g., EEOC v. University of N.M., 504 F.2d 1296, 1301 (10th Cir. 1974);
Scott v. City of Anniston, 430 F. Supp. 508, 516 (N.D. Ala. 1977); Henderson v. First
Nat'l Bank, 360 F. Supp. 531, 547 (M.D. Ala. 1973).
86. See notes 14-17 supra and accompanying text.
87. To avoid these possible effects of the Evans dictum, the EEOC has stated
its interpretation of the Court's opinion, trying to limit the case to its facts:
The Commission interprets United Airlines v. Evans to hold only that
discharges are not continuing violations. If a claim for unlawful discharge is
not filed within 180 days of termination, the charge is not timely.
The Commission does not consider that the case affects the continuing
violation principle with respect to other employment practices. In particular,
any allegation of discriminatory denial of transfer or promotion will be
deemed continuing if the practice or policy accounting for the denial remains
in effect within 180 days of the charge. The Commission will assume jurisdic-
tion over such allegations.
2 EMPL. PRAc. GuiDE (CCH) 5029, at 3106 (EEOC Interpretive Memorandum, dated
July 8, 1977) (adopted July 12, 1977 by the EEOC).
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board Coastline Railroad," the court distinguished Evans as not in-
volving a violation that was part of a pattern or practice of discrimi-
nation. 9 The court held that when such a pattern exists, the continu-
ing violation doctrine still applies. In Dickerson v. United States
Steel Corp. ," however, another court gave Evans an expansive read-
ing: "[Tihe Court [in Evans] holds that a prior discriminatory act
cannot be a basis of liability if the individual failed to file a charge
...even if its effects are continuing. This opinion clearly holds that
the statute of limitations is an absolute bar and that it cannot be
circumvented by 'lock-in.' "'
The impact of the dictum in Evans on the continuing violation
doctrine is therefore uncertain. Several factors, however, indicate
that the Court's dictum should be narrowly construed. First, a dis-
criminatory termination, by itself, has never been held to be a con-
tinuing violation, even though the effects of the discrimination may
continue to linger in the life of the employee.2 The continuing viola-
tion cases, therefore, are consistent with Evans. Second, the exis-
tence of present effects of past acts has not been regarded as a crucial
link in the formation of a pattern of discrimination.13 Rather, in find-
ing a pattern, the courts have placed more reliance on the linking
effects of a repetition of discriminatory acts and existence of an on-
going employment relationship. 4 These stronger links were not pres-
ent in Evans, and therefore the continuing violation doctrine appears
to remain viable when those two themes exist. A third reason for not
discarding the continuing violation doctrine, absent a more direct
88. 435 F. Supp. 310 (W.D.N.C. 1977).
89. Neither plaintiff in the Evans or [International Union of Elec., Radio
& Mach. Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229 (1976)] cases
appeared to have alleged a pattern or practice of racial discrimination in
employment. Neither plaintiff alleged that any discriminatory practices con-
tinued after the discharge. Neither case was a class action.
Plaintiff in this case has alleged a pattern or practice of racial discrimi-
nation that continues against him and a class of black employees and appli-
cants recently certified by this court partially on the basis of evidence show-
ing similar racial disparities throughout defendant's facilities.
Id. at 312. See Acha v. Beame, 570 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1978) ("A continuously maintained
illegal employment policy may be the subject of a valid complaint within a specified
number of days after the last occurrence of an instance of that policy."); Miller v.
Miami Prefabricators, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 176 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (though Evans may limit
proof of actual violation of Title VII to 180-day period, court is not constrained to go
beyond limitations period for purposes of remedy).
90. 439 F. Supp. 55 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
91. Id. at 70.
92. See note 24 supra.
93. See Farris v. Board of Educ., 576 F.2d 765, 768-69 (8th Cir. 1978) (construing
Evans as indicating present effects of past discrimination was not a linking theme).
94. See notes 33-34, 64-67 supra and accompanying text.
MINNESOTA LA W REVIEW
expression by the Supreme Court, is that the doctrine, as developed
by lower courts, has received some measure of congressional ap-
proval. During the consideration of the 1972 amendments to the Act,
which effected, inter alia, a lengthening of the limitations period, 5 an
attitude of acceptance was expressed toward the continuing violation
doctrine, even though it was realized that the doctrine results in a
circumvention of the limitations period." Apparently, Congress at-
95. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
96. In establishing the new time period for the filing of charges, it is
not intended that existing law, which has shown an inclination to interpret
this type of time limitation to give the aggrieved person the maximum bene-
fit of the law, should be in any way circumscribed. Existing case law which
has determined that certain types of -violations are continuing in nature,
thereby measuring the running of the required time period from the last
occurrence of the discrimination and not from the first occurrence is contin-
ued, and other interpretations of the courts maximizing the coverage of the
law are not affected. It is intended by expanding the time period for filing
charges in this subsection that aggrieved individuals, who frequently are
untrained laymen who are not always aware of the discrimination which is
practiced against them, should be given a greater opportunity to prepare
their charges and file their complaints, and that existent but undiscovered
acts of discrimination should not escape the effect of the law through a
procedural oversight.
118 CONG. Rac. 4941 (1972)(remarks of Senator Williams, Chairman, Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare, concerning S.2515, which the Senate passed; the House
replaced S.2515 with H.R.1746, which eventually became law and which contained the
same extensions of the limitations periods as S.2515).
It is possible, of course, that this 1972 expression of congressional approval does
not accurately reflect the views of the Congress that passed the Act in 1964. In Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), the Supreme Court,
interpreting another section of Title VII that was viewed differently by the Congresses
of 1964 and 1972, found the 1964 legislative history to be controlling. The Court stated:
[Tlhe section of Title VII we construe here, § 703(h), was enacted in 1964,
not 1972. The views of members of a later Congress, concerning different
sections of Title VII, enacted after this litigation was commenced, are enti-
tled to little if any weight. It is the intent of the Congress that enacted
§ 703(h) in 1964, unmistakable in this case, that controls.
Id. at 354 n.39.
It is thus possible that the Supreme Court may accord "little if any weight" to
the congressional approval given the continuing violation doctrine in 1972. But there
are two important differences between the section of the Act construed in Teamsters
and the section establishing the limitations period for filing with the EEOC. First, the
opinion in Teamsters makes it clear that there was a great deal of debate about the
meaning of section 703(h) in the Senate in 1964. The only piece of legislative history
concerning the continuing violation doctrine, however, is from 1972, and in seeking
expressions of congressional intent beyond the words of the Act itself, the Supreme
Court therefore can only look to the 1972 amendments. Second, section 703(h) has not
been amended since its original enactment in 1964, while Congress changed the limita-
tions period from 90 to 180 days (or from 210 days to 300 days where a state agency is
involved), in 1972. See note 7 supra. Of course, any litigation after 1972 is governed
by this amendment. It would seem, then, that the congressional approval of the con-
tinuing violation doctrine is more authoritative than the congressional approval of the
lower courts' interpretation of section 703(h).
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tached some importance to letting the courts arrive at their own
equitable resolution of the conflicting policies of Title VII. Finally,
perhaps the most compelling reason to conclude that the Supreme
Court's one-sentence dictum in Evans should not be interpreted to
preclude use of the continuing violation doctrine is simply that the
doctrine facilitates Title VII enforcement. It furthers the elimination
of discrimination in employment by allowing employees to file un-
timely claims and obtain redress. As long as it furthers the policies
underlying Title VII, it should be retained in at least some form.
The Court's evident conclusion in Evans, however, was that to
deem the particular violation alleged in that case to be continuing in
any way would not promote the policies of Title VII but instead would
frustrate them. It is not a policy of the Act that an employer remain
liable for a discriminatory act that occurred years in the past. In
order to fully evaluate the continuing violation doctrine, therefore, it
is necessary to examine the balance that it achieves between the
substantive policies of the Act and the policies that underlie the
limitations period.
IV. EXTENSION OF EMPLOYER LIABILITY
Once a present violation has been found there are two possibili-
ties: either the employer may be held liable for only that portion-of
his discriminatory conduct that is present,97 that is, within 180 days
prior to the filing of the complaint, or he may be liable for his entire
"continuous" discriminatory conduct. 8
It is not entirely clear which of these possibilities the courts have
chosen because the procedural context in which the continuing viola-
tion doctrine is usually applied precludes, for the most part, an ex-
97. See notes 14-17 supra and accompanying text.
98. In areas of the law other than Title VII, courts do not allow recovery for
actions that occurred beyond a limitations period, even when regularly repeated viola-
tions clearly forming a "pattern" exist. A separate cause of action arises with each
repetition of a wrongful act, see, e.g., Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp.,
377 F.2d 777, 795 (3d Cir. 1967), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 392
U.S. 481 (1968), and each cause of action expires when the applicable limitations
period runs. See, e.g., Baum Assocs., Inc. v. Society Brand Hat Co., 447 F.2d 255 (8th
Cir. 1973) (installments on commissions not recoverable past the limitations period);
Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 418 F.2d 21, 26 (7th Cir. 1969); Tit-
comb v. Norton Co., 208 F. Supp. 9 (D. Conn. 1959), aff'd 307 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1962)
(statute of limitations bars recovery only for breaches occurring beyond the statutory
period); Hitchcockv. Union & New Haven Trust Co., 134 Conn. 246,56 A.2d 655 (1947)
(recovery for employment on a week-to-week basis barred for employment more than
six years prior to bringing of the action). But see Montgomery v. Crum, 199 Ind. 660,
161 N.E. 251 (1928) (in mother's suit for the wrongful abduction of her child, it was
for the jury to decide whether acts over a period of nine years constituted only one
continuous wrong, so as to bypass the statute of limitations and permit recovery for
the full period).
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plicit discussion of remedies.9 The extent of employer liability has
been directly addressed, however, in cases in which defendants have
moved to strike, as outside the courts' jurisdiction, allegations of past
violations. In several instances, the continuing violation doctrine has
been used to hold the employer liable for the whole of a discrimina-
tory pattern and effectively render the limitations period a nullity.',,
If the Title VII limitations period is without effect in this con-
text, employers may be liable for actions occurring five years, ten
years, or even longer in the past. The position taken by the courts in
cases concerning discriminatory retirement plans illustrates this
99. The question of whether or not a continuing violation exists typically arises
in response to an employer's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
because the employee failed to file his charge with the EEOC within the applicable
limitations period. The court considers only the motion to dismiss in its opinion. If a
continuing violation is found, the motion is denied, but the plaintiff, of course, still
must prove his allegations of discrimination at trial. Only if he is successful at trial
does the question of the scope of the remedy arise. See, e.g., Mixson v. Southern Bell
Tel. & Tel. Co., 334 F. Supp. 525, 526-27 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
100. See, e.g., Tarvesian v. Carr Div. TRW, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 336, 339 (D. Mass.
1976) ("[Wihere there is a mixture of timely and untimely claims, the issue to be
decided is whether the facts constitute a continuing pattern of discrimination, comm-
encing more than three hundred (300) days prior to the filing of the complaint with
the E.E.O.C., yet progressing uninterruptedly into that time frame. If plaintiff can
prove such an integrated pattern of discrimination, the defendants become liable for
the whole of it."); Lattimore v. Loews Theatres, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 1397, 1399
(M.D.N.C. 1975); Kohn v. Royall, Koegel & Wells, 59 F.R.D. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),
appeal dismissed, 496 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir. 1974) (untimely claim of representative of
class of employees is properly considered by court as part of overall pattern of discrimi-
nation practiced by employer); Fekete v. United States Steel Corp., 353 F. Supp. 1177,
1185 (W.D. Pa. 1973) ("Although a number of the incidents alleged to be discrimina-
tory were not shown to have occurred within the statutory period . . . we find that
plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the existence of a pattern of discrimination occurring
throughout the course of his employment to require us to consider these incidents on
the merits."); Tippet v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 316 F. Supp. 292 (M.D.N.C.
1970).
But see Loo v. Gerarge, 374 F. Supp. 1338 (D. Hawaii 1974), where four untimely
acts (general harassment, denial of transfer requests, demeaning work assignments,
and malicious intent) and one timely act (a discriminatory discharge) were alleged.
The court declined to find that these acts formed a pattern of discrimination and thus
a continuing violation. The plaintiff seemed to argue only that the unlawful practices
had " 'continuing effects' into the present," and the court rejected this as a basis for
Title VII liability: "Once a disparaging remark is made, or a transfer is denied, or a
demeaning work assignment is given, it is, without more, a completed and isolated act:
such practices do not give the Plaintiff a perpetual right to file charges before the
EEOC." Id. at 1340.
The court viewed each discriminatory act as isolated and having no connection to
the others. It is possible, however, that the outcome of this case would have been
different had the plaintiff argued that the employer's repeated acts constituted a
pattern of discrimination. See notes 31 & 33 supra and accompanying text. This
argument would have been justified on the facts of the case.
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problem. In American Finance System, Inc. v. Harlow, "o for example,
an employer had a pension plan under which a female employee who
voluntarily terminated employment before her retirement date could
receive an immediate payment of her accrued interest in the pension
fund, while a male employee was ineligible for payment until his
fiftieth birthday. On January 1, 1970, the employer voluntarily elimi-
nated any difference between males and females and sued for a decla-
ratory judgment that it was not compelled immediately to distribute
funds to those male employees who voluntarily terminated employ-
ment-whether before or after the effective date of Title VII (July 1,
1965)-but had not yet reached the age of fifty. To the evident sur-
prise of the employer,' ° the employees counterclaimed as a class,
alleging that the pension plan as operated before January 1, 1970
violated Title VII. The court included in the class all males who had
retired prior to January 1, 1970, and who were ineligible to receive
payments because they still were less than fifty years old."3 The
result was that, since the pension plan was a continuing violation, the
employer was faced with potential liability to ex-employees on claims
that originated almost twenty years in the past. Given the bona fide
attempt by the employer to eliminate the discriminatory elements of
its pension plan, this extension of liability seems unjust. The court
stated, however, that because of the continuing link between the
employer and the employee, the violation-and liability-could con-
tinue.1 0
It has been recognized that an employer is entitled to the tradi-
tional protections afforded by a statute of limitations.'15 He should
not be exposed to the prejudice that can surround the bringing of
stale claims but should be able to rest easy, without fear of
"'surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to
slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded and wit-
nesses have disappeared.' "101 Certainly, the employer in Harlow was
101. 65 F.R.D 94 (D. Md. 1974).
102. Id. at 98.
103. Id. at 105, 108-09.
104. Id. at 103.
105. See, e.g., Olson v. Rembrandt Printing Co., 511 F.2d 1228, 1234 (8th Cir.
1975)("to construe loosely 'continuing' discrimination would undermine the theory
underlying the statute of limitations. . . . "); McCarty v. Boeing Co., 321 F. Supp.
260, 261 (W.D. Wash. 1970) (acts held not continuing in nature because of purposes
behind statute of limitations).
106. Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965)(quoting Order of
R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944)).
Although Burnett dealt with the Federal Employers' Liability Act and not Title VII,
courts considering the proper role of the limitations period in the Title VII context have
used it as authority. See, e.g., Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888, 892
(5th Cir. 1970); Kennan v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 721, 727 (N.D.
Cal. 1976).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
in need of this traditional protection against prejudice. After twenty
years, some difficulty in resurrecting potentially exculpatory records
would be inevitable. Unexpected and unbudgeted expenses from an
adverse judgment might create financial difficulties. Old complaints
and the threat of extensive liability could reduce employer flexibility
in operation and planning and even might have an adverse effect on
the labor market. 07
Another factor to be considered in determining the propriety of
extending employer liability is that strict enforcement of the limita-
tions period promotes the congressional policy of conciliation between
the employer and the aggrieved employee.' 8 Extending liability will
increase the amount of any judgment. An employer may be more
inclined to litigate than settle when his potential liability is in-
creased, at least when the allegation of an employee is of doubtful
validity.' 9
By extending employer liability beyond the limitations period,
the courts have implicitly determined that any prejudice that might
accrue to employers, or any other policies furthered by strict adher-
ence to the limitations period, are outweighed by the fact that the
107. See Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888, 892 (5th Cir. 1970). It
should be noted, however, that this liability is limited by statute. See note 75 supra.
108. The Commission "shall endeavor to eliminate any . . . alleged unlawful
employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persua-
sion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). This argument, however, ignores
the fact that because of the great number of claims filed each year with the EEOC,
many employees become eligible to sue without any conciliation effort by the EEOC.
See Tippet v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 316 F. Supp. 292, 296 (M.D.N.C. 1970).
109. It may be argued, per contra, that the continuing violation doctrine, as
presently used to extend liability, is an added deterrent that keeps employers from
discriminating and helps to eliminate discrimination. The Supreme Court has recog-
nized, specifically in the area of remedies, that strong deterrent measures further the
goals of Title VII. In Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976), the Court
stated that an award of retroactive seniority to the victims of illegal hiring discrimina-
tion was not barred because that would "undermine the mutually reinforcing effect of
the dual purposes of Title VII; it reduces the restitution required of an employer at
such time as he is called upon to account for his discriminatory actions perpetuated
in violation of the law." Id. at 767 n.27 (1976). Furthermore,
[b]ackpay forces the employer to account for economic benefits that it
wrongfully has denied the victim of such discrimination. The statutory pur-
poses and equitable principles converge, for requiring payment of wrongfully
withheld wages deters further wrongdoing at the same time that their restitu-
tion to the victim helps make him whole.
Id. at 786 (Powell, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part)(footnote omitted).
However, since a violation can continue only if there is a present act of discrimina-
tion for which the employer will be liable whether or not liability is extended beyond
the limitations period, it is at best uncertain whether added liability actually serves
as an additional deterrent.
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extension of liability furthers the substantive policies of Title VII:"0
eliminating discrimination in employment and "making whole" the
victims of discrimination."' Unfortunately, this balancing process
seems to be almost entirely subconscious in most cases. At present,
the finding of a continuing violation requires only the finding of a
pattern of discrimination, not a balancing of the policies behind the
limitations period against Title VII's substantive policies. In cases
in which an employment relationship is ongoing and an employer
commits more than one discriminatory act, the finding of a pattern
and thus a continuing violation seems almost certain and the liability
of the employer may be extended.12 Whether the employer will suffer
great prejudice from the finding of a continuing violation is rarely
directly considered.
It is not suggested that, even from the perspective of the tradi-
tional purposes behind the statute of limitations, a pattern analysis
is totally irrelevant. The repetition of violations over time, the contin-
uation of an employment relationship, and the perpetuation of past
effects do indicate a certain awareness by an offending employer of
the relationship between his current discriminatory acts and his past
ones. In many cases, this awareness may lessen the equitable urgency
of protecting the employer from the prejudice inherent in litigation
of stale claims. The employer's continual discrimination may be con-
sidered as a conscious waiver of limitations period protection.
This rationale makes sense as a general matter inasmuch as it is
the employer who determines whether a violation will continue. If an
110. At least one court has explicitly recognized that "[tihe 'continuing viola-
tion' doctrine constitutes judicial recognition of the overriding importance of Title
VII's substantive policies when compared with the Act's 'statute of limitations'. ... "
Kennan v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 721, 727 (N.D. Cal. 1976)(foot-
note omitted).
111. "The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the
language of the statute. It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and
remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white
employees over other employees." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30
(1971).
In Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 421 U.S. 747, 764 (1976), the Court stated that
"the Act is intended to make the victims of unlawful employment discrimination whole
* . . persons aggrieved by the consequences and effects of the unlawful employment
practice should be, so far as possible, restored to a position where they would have been
were it not for the unlawful discrimination." (quoting Section-By-Section Analysis of
H.R. 1746, accompanying The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972- Confer-
ence Report, 118 CONG. REC. 7166, 7168 (1972)).
Title VII is also specially directed toward the elimination of discrimination carried
on in a systematic manner by the employer. See note 10 supra; see, e.g., Grohal v.
Stauffer Chem. Co., 385 F. Supp. 1267, 1269 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (quoting Ogletree v.
McNamara, 449 F.2d 93, 98 (6th Cir. 1971)).
112. See text accompanying notes 68-71 supra.
1978]
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illegal practice immediately stops, the employer receives the full pro-
tection of the statute of limitations.' But if, after 180 days have
elapsed, the employer repeats the practice, or commits a discrimina-
tory act sufficiently related to the original practice, the courts treat
the employer as if he had carried on the practice in a continuous
manner.
The continuing violation doctrine, by looking only at the linking
themes of repetition of violations, continuation of employment rela-
tionship, and continuation of past effects, does not adequately en-
sure that an employer will not be prejudiced. It was concern for this
undue employer prejudice that was at the root of the Supreme Court's
reservations about applying the continuing violation doctrine in
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans."' In order to be responsive to Evans,
courts using the continuing violation doctrine in the future should
take into account, more directly than they now do, the prejudice that
may accrue to an employer from a finding of a continuing violation.
The future viability of the doctrine may depend on whether courts
adequately balance the need to strengthen the substantive goals of
the Act with the need to avoid this prejudice.
V. A PROPOSED CHANGE IN THE CONTINUING
VIOLATION DOCTRINE
It is not possible to separate the question of whether a "pattern"
exists from the question of whether a continuing violation of Title VII
exists. Clearly, before any violation can be called continuing, it must
be shown that the discriminatory practices of an employer amount
to something more than one isolated act and, in most cases, that the
practices occurred within an employment relationship. When these
two "themes" are present, a continuing violation usually will be
found."' The change in the continuing violation doctrine suggested
by this Note is simply that a finding that a continuing violation exists
does not automatically follow from a showing that one or more linking
themes exist. Rather, a continuing violation should be found only
when, in addition, it can be said that such a finding would further
the policies of the Act.
The use of the continuing violation doctrine in its first sense-to
establish federal jurisdiction for an aggrieved employee despite an
untimely filing-seems perfectly consonant with the policies of the
Act. The Act is largely enforced by layperson employees who might
113. See Campbell v. A. C. Petersen Farms, Inc., 69 F.R.D. 457, 463 (D. Conn.
1975) (complaint alleging continuing violation dismissed upon proof that employer
phased out discriminatory policy); note 30 supra and accompanying text.
114. 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
115. See notes 31-34 and 68-70 supra and accompanying text.
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not readily understand that their Title VII rights must be asserted
within 180 days. To recognize that such an employee's complaint
alleging more than one act or an ongoing discriminatory policy states
a valid cause of action therefore aids in furthering the "private attor-
ney general" enforcement function of the Act. Moreover, in many
cases, dismissal by the court would be futile because, if the employer
is continually discriminating the employee could simply refile his
grievance. In short, this use of the continuing violation doctrine
should remain unchanged.
The second use of the continuing violation doctrine-to extend
employer liability beyond the limitations period to encompass both
timely and untimely acts of discrimination-does not so clearly fur-
ther the policies of the Act. Although such an extension of liability
furthers the substantive policies of Title VII, it may contravene the
policies underlying the short limitations period imposed by Con-
gress."' These latter policies will be frustrated in every case where an
employer suffers undue prejudice from an extension of liability.
Therefore, the change suggested in the continuing violation doctrine
is that courts should find a continuing violation for purposes of ex-
tending liability only when assured that the employer will not suffer
undue prejudice.
At least one court has adopted this suggested approach, and
directly considered the possibility of prejudice in a continuing viola-
tion determination. In Kennan v. Pan American World Airways,
Inc.,"' a California district court made the following observations:
In the instant case, the valuable statute of limitations policy of
guarding against stale complaints is barely threatened. Here we
have original discriminatory acts of forced resignation pursuant to
a blanket, facially discriminatory policy of terminating pregnant
women. There are few, if any, individual circumstances which might
require proof at trial; in fact, at oral argument, defense counsel was
unable to describe any "statute of limitations"-related prejudice
that might accrue. Because there is little or no visible prejudice to
Pan Am by virtue of the lapse of time since its original act of dis-
crimination, defendant's need for statute of limitations protection
is minimized here.-
116. See notes 105-08 supra and accompanying text.
117. 424 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
118. Id. at 727-28. There is additional precedent for an inquiry into prejudice.
In Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972), the Court dispensed with another, more
technical, filing requirement of Title VII, partly because the employer failed to show
that it would suffer any prejudice. The Court stated, "We see no reason why further
action by the aggrieved party should be required .... The respondent makes no
showing of prejudice to its interests. To require a second 'filing' by the aggrieved party
... would serve no purpose other than the creation of an additional procedural techni-
cality." Id. at 526.
1978]
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As Kennan demonstrates, the suggested technique is a simple
means of effecting the policies underlying the short limitations period
of the Act. It is essential to guarantee fairness to the employer.
As an attractive by-product, it also eliminates some of the confu-
sion that otherwise arises from trying to decide when an employer's
acts constitute a pattern of discrimination. For example, to find a
continuing violation in the first sense of establishing jurisdiction, it
generally is necessary that the employment relationship be ongoing.
Thus, if the untimely act of discrimination complained of by an indi-
vidual is a termination, no present discriminatory act exists and there
is no continuing violation. On the other hand, if there has been a
discriminatory layoff rather than termination, the employment rela-
tionship still will be ongoing, and a present violation may be inferred.
In the second use of the continuing violation doctrine, however, there
will be no operative distinction between a layoff and a termination if
the suggested approach is used. The court will have before it past and
present acts of discrimination. It will decide only whether to extend
the liability of the employer to the past act, and termination of the
employment relationship between the past and present acts should
not be determinative. Liability should be extended unless the
employer can show he will suffer prejudice as a result.
The best procedure for implementing the suggested approach is
as follows: If the employee states facts from which it may be inferred
(1) that the employer has committed more than one violation of Title
VII (several distinct acts indicating systematic repetition of the same
policy), and (2) that at least one of the alleged acts is a present
violation, that is, that it occurred within the applicable limitations
period, a continuing violation will be considered to exist. The em-
ployer then will have an opportunity to raise as a defense any possible
prejudice that may accrue from such a finding. Finally, the court,
after considering the particular facts of the case, will decide if the
prejudice cited by the employer is significant enough to counterbal-
ance the need to make the aggrieved employee "whole." If the exist-
ing prejudice warrants a dismissal of the continuing violation allega-
tion, the consideration of the court will be limited to the alleged
present violation. If not, the total pattern of employer misconduct
will be considered and liability will be extended accordingly.
The burden to come forward with evidence of prejudice is placed
on the employer for two reasons. First, an employer is much more
likely to have access to facts tending to show prejudice than an em-
ployee is to have evidence showing an absence of prejudice. For exam-
ple, the potential costs if liability is found, the difficulty of producing
records, and conflicts concerning planned changes in employment
practices all are likely to be known only by the employer. Second, and
more important, placing the burden on the employer reflects the
[Vol. 63:119
CONTINUING VIOLATIONS
favorable approach taken toward employees by the courts and subse-
quently approved by Congress and therefore furthers the substantive
policies of the Act.
The burden placed on the employer is not an onerous one. There
are several ways prejudice could be shown from an extension of lia-
bility."9 First, the employer could show that an inordinate amount
of time had passed between the alleged discriminatory acts. Such a
showing would be indicative of prejudice and seem to warrant relief
analogous to that accorded under the common law doctrine of
laches.2 5 If a past act is so far removed in time from a present viola-
tion that to extend liability would result in injustice, a continuing
violation should not be found even if other factors are present indicat-
ing the absence of prejudice. Such would have been the case in
American Finance Systems, Inc. v. Harlow, 2' where the employer
was asked to account for claims arising almost twenty years in the
past.
Second, it should be relevant to any determination of employer
prejudice that, as in United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 2 2 the employer
practice complained of had been adjudicated by another court.'2 In
such a situation, the employer should be allowed to rest easy without
threat of future complaints concerning the same practice. Any recov-
ery against him should be limited to what is necessary to remedy a
present violation.
Finally, there are a number of miscellaneous factors that an
employer could point to in showing prejudice. Perhaps the most per-
suasive of these would be the availability of records to disprove em-
119. It always should be open for the employer to limit his liability by showing
that the alleged discriminatory practice has stopped. Of course, he still would be liable
for the practice for 180 days.
120. [Cases discussing laches] proceed on the assumption that the
party to whom laches is imparted has knowledge of his rights, and an ample
opportunity to establish them in the proper forum; that by reason of his
delay the adverse party has good reason to believe that the alleged rights are
worthless, or have been abandoned; and that because of the change in condi-
tion or relations during this period of delay, it would be an injustice to the
latter to permit him to now assert them.
Galliher v. Cadwell, 145 U.S. 368, 372 (1892). Laches generally is invoked when a
plaintiff's lack of diligence in asserting rights in a timely fashion is combined with
prejudice to the defendant. See Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 282 (1961);
Rouse v. Underwood, 242 Cal. App. 2d 316, 323, 51 Cal. Rptr. 437, 442 (1966). Some
courts, however, have recognized "stale demand" as a species of laches whereby a delay
in asserting a claim is so lengthy as to create a presumption that injustice would be
done to the defendant if the court granted the claim. See, e.g., Sullivant v. Sullivant,
239 Ark. 953, 956, 396 S.W.2d 279, 281 (1965).
121. 65 F.R.D. 94 (D. Md. 1974). See text accompanying notes 101-104 supra.
122. 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
123. See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
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ployee allegations. In addition, if the employer can show that he
legitimately has been surprised by the possibility of an extension of
liability and that the effects of a large, unexpected judgment would
have disruptive business effects, he also may succeed in showing
prejudice.124
The procedure suggested in this Note will improve on present law
in at least two ways. First, it will shift the main focus of the courts'
continuing violation inquiries from the search for a "pattern" to a
determination of possible employer prejudice whenever extension of
liability is at issue. This will eliminate much of the confusion and
conflict that permeates current continuing violation doctrine case
law. Second, by concentrating on whether the employer is unduly
prejudiced, the suggested approach takes directly into account the
conflicting policies of the Act, and more equitable and principled
outcomes should result.
124. It is unlikely that adoption of this proposal will produce radical change in
current law. In retirement cases, where employers presently face suit from employees
for so long as the employees are connected with the retirement fund, the proposal
probably will produce a change favoring employers. In most other cases, however,
employers who carry on discriminatory policies of hiring, firing, transferring, and pro-
moting, will still be held liable, because the employer will be unable to show undue
prejudice.
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